Paul Hatchdba P.H. Properties v. Kevin Rogan dba Sierra Properties : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Paul Hatchdba P.H. Properties v. Kevin Rogan dba
Sierra Properties : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert R. Wallace; Hansen, Epperson & Smith; Attorneys for Appellee; David L. Church; Attorney
for Appellee.
Gregory J. Sanders; Sandra L. Steinvoort; Kipp & Christian, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Paul Hatch, P.H. Properties v. Kevin Rogan, Sierra Properties, No. 950098 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6444
UTAH 
BRIEF 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
J\V] 
PAUL HATCH dba 
P. H. PROPERTIES, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
KEVIN ROGAN dba 
SIERRA PROPERTIES, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
DOCKET NO.. 
Case No. 950098-CA 
P r i o r i t y 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE PHILLIP K. PALMER 
DAVID L. CHURCH 
Attorney for Appellee 
560 East 200 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 355-1888 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellee 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
FILED 
MAY 1 5 1 9 9 5 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAUL HATCH dba 
P. H. PROPERTIES, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
KEVIN ROGAN dba 
SIERRA PROPERTIES, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 950098-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE PHILLIP K. PALMER 
DAVID L. CHURCH 
Attorney for Appellee 
560 East 200 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 355-1888 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellee 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
STATEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES 
All parties to this proceeding appear in the caption. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of right under Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(d), this being an appeal from a circuit court 
order over which the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
See Brief of Appellant. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following provisions are reproduced in the Addendum: 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 4-108, The Code of Judicial Administration 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action by a lessor against a lessee for unpaid 
rent with the lessee counter-claiming for alleged water damage to 
property stored on the leased premises. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
The following are dates of specific actions taken in the 
case and, where appropriate, the address of Defendant/Appellee 
Rogan to which any notices were sent according to certificates of 
mailing filed with the documents in question. 
DATE DOCUMENT ADDRESS RECORD 
5/19/93 Complaint filed by p.l 
Plaintiff for Eviction 
and Unpaid Rent 
iv 
DATE 
6/10/93 
6/14/93 
2/7/94 
2/9/94 
3/4/94 
4/13/94 
4/13/94 
4/21/94 
5/26/94 
5/31/94 
DOCUMENT 
Summons served on Kevin 
Rogan personally-
Certified Letter from 
Defendant Rogan to the 
Clerk of the Court 
Certificate of Readiness 
for Trial filed by Plain-
tiff 
Pre-trial Settlement Con-
ference ordered for 3/3/94 
Notice of Trial set for 
4/19/94 
Motion to Vacate Trial by 
John E. Diaz, attorney for 
defendant Rogan 
Verified Counterclaim filed 
with John E. Diaz's name at 
the top of the counterclaim, 
but signed by Kevin Rogan 
The reply of Mr. Hatch to 
the counterclaim filed 
Motion to Withdraw, filed 
by John E. Diaz 
6/14/94 
Order Allowing Counsel to 
Withdraw, indicating that 
"ORDERED that John E. Diaz 
. . . is hereby relieved of 
all duties and responsibil-
ities . . . " 
Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed by Robert R. Wallace, 
and a Request for Hearing 
ADDRESS 
Kevin Rogan, 211 
Sandrun Road, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 
84103 (hereafter 
"Sandrun Address") 
Sandrun Address 
Sandrun Address 
Sandrun Address 
Sandrun Address 
RECORD 
John E. Diaz 
p.8 
p.13 
p.15 
p.16 
p.18 
p.22 
p.38 
Kevin Rogan, 6911 p.51 
South 1300 East, 
Suite 146, Midvale, 
Utah 84047-1817 
(hereafter "Midvale 
Address") 
Midvale Address p.54 
Midvale Address p.56,66 
v 
DATE 
6/20/94 
6/24/94 
7/20/94 
7/28/94 
8/1/94 
8/3/94 
8/16/94 
8/30/94 
DOCUMENT 
Notice of a Hearing to be 
held on 7/28/94 
Notice of Appoint Another 
Attorney or Appear in 
Person, filed by Robert 
R. Wallace, indicating 
M
. . . gives notice to 
Kevin Rogan . . . to appoint 
another attorney or to appear 
in person in this action." 
The notice continues, 
"Further proceedings may be 
held after 20 days . . . " 
Kevin Rogan allegedly writes to 
the Clerk of the Court, listing 
a return address, the Sandrun 
Address. No notice is given to 
any other parties of the letter. 
Hearing held on Motion for 
Summary Judgment per notice 
from the court of 7/20/94, above, 
Mr. Rogan did not appear. He 
may have called the Court and 
determined that the hearing was 
indeed to be held on the day on 
which it was noticed. 
ADDRESS RECORD 
Midvale Address p.73 
Midvale Address p.75 
& Sandrun Address 
p.78 
A draft of the proposed 
plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment on 
defendant's counter-
claim was sent to the court. 
Order on Plaintiff's motion 
for Summary Judgment on De-
fendant 's counterclaim 
executed. 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Affidavit of Paul Hatch, 
filed by David L. Church 
Notice to Submit for 
Decision filed by David L. 
Church 
Sandrun Address and 
Midvale Address 
Sandrun Address 
& Midvale Address 
p.79 
Sandrun Address p.84,91 
Sandrun Address p.93 
vi 
DATE DOCUMENT 
9/6/94 Ruling made by Judge Palmer 
on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Original 
Claim in favor of Plaintiff 
for $20,000.00 Notice sent 
by Court Clerk to all parties 
9/9/94 Notice of Signing of 
Judgment of $20,000.00 
10/6/94 Motion to Set Aside Both 
Default: Summary Judgments 
filed by Gregory J. Sanders 
11/10/94 Court denied Motion to Set 
Aside Summary Judgments 
1/9/95 Court signed formal order 
denying motion 
2/8/95 Notice of Appeal Filed 
by Gregory J. Sanders 
ADDRESS 
Sandrun Address 
RECORD 
p.98 
p.98 
p.103 
p.156 
p.156 
p.158 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in 
denying Defendant/Appellant's Motion for relief from judgment on 
the original claim. Defendant/Appellant has failed to establish 
any excusable neglect and/or to set forth a meritorious defense. 
The original claim in this action falls clearly within the 
circuit court's jurisdiction. Even if the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim, the motion for summary 
judgment on the original primary claim was not filed until the 
counterclaim was dismissed. The judgment on the original claim, 
at least, should be affirmed. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee argues that the trial court had 
both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the counter-
vii 
claim, as well. A circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over counterclaims for money and judgments regarding property 
damage and the authority to grant relief up to $20,000. The 
Defendant/Appellant in this case chose to submit himself to 
jurisdiction of the court and should have the right to waive 
recovery of amounts over the jurisdictional limit of the court. 
viii 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DENIAL OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
A. Applicable Law 
When a trial court is ruling on a motion for relief 
from judgment under Rule 60(b), the court is allowed broad 
discretion. The trial court's determination shall not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 
1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Setting aside a judgment under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 60(b)(1) requires the showing of a timely motion 
and a meritorious defense, in addition to excusable neglect, 
mistake, inadvertence or surprise. State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1983); Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 
882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). A meritorious defense is one which 
sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts which, if 
proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one 
entered. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053. Courts should favor upholding 
judgments even when there are flaws (such as a showing of 
excusable neglect) unless the outcome of the case would have been 
different. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
The trial court correctly found that the Appellant did 
not have excusable neglect under Rule 60(b). In the Appellant's 
Affidavit, he acknowledged that he appeared in court on July 20, 
1994, after receiving a Notice, on June 24, 1994, to Appoint 
1 
Another Attorney or Appear in Person. Record, p. 75, 114. At 
this time the Appellant knew that his counsel had withdrawn and 
that he was responsible to appear in person or appoint new 
counsel. 
All of the Appellant's arguments try to explain why he 
didn't appear at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment 
of the Counterclaim on July 28, 1994. In the Affidavit of the 
Appellant's wife, she states that the Appellant returned from his 
son's wedding on or about August 9, 1994. Record, p. 122. The 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the principal claim in 
this matter was filed after August 10, 1994, was appropriately 
copied to the Appellant, and was not Submitted for Decision to 
the Judge until August 30, 1994. Record, p. 91-93. 
The Appellant makes no factual or equitable arguments 
as to why he did not appear at this hearing, and how his actions 
could possibly constitute excusable neglect. 
A Motion to Set Aside a Judgment is properly denied 
where the Appellant offers no reasonable excuse for his 
nonappearance, fails to respond to repeated attempts to contact 
him regarding the status of the lawsuit he knew was pending, and 
knew that a hearing had been scheduled and that his counsel had 
withdrawn. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah, 1979). The facts 
in this case are similar and clearly support the trial court's 
decision that the judgment should not be set aside. 
The facts plainly show that by the end of July, 1994, 
the Appellant knew that his attorney had withdrawn; he knew that 
2 
a Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on the primary claim on 
the 17th of August, 1994; and he failed to respond to that Motion 
even after receiving a copy of the Request for the clerk to 
Submit such Motion for Decision, This failure to act is not 
excusable neglect, mistake, inadvertence or surprise. The facts 
do not justify the setting aside of the Summary Judgment on the 
principal claim. Thus the trial court's holding was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
The Appellant also fails to establish the necessary 
meritorious defense in order to set aside the judgment. The 
Appellant has set forth no specific or sufficiently detailed 
facts which would result in a different outcome of the case. 
The Appellant does not allege that he paid the rent. 
He tries to establish a defense in regards to the water damage 
that apparently took place. The contract between the parties 
specifically assigns the risk of water damage to the Appellant. 
Because the risk was assumed by the Appellant, the results of the 
Summary Judgment would not differ had the Appellant appeared at 
the hearing. The case was decided on the merits, not due to a 
default. 
The defense of the Appellant was not supported by any 
facts. Whether the Appellant appeared or not would have made no 
difference to the outcome of the Summary Judgment, The trial 
court looked at all the facts and found that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact and that the law required the 
Appellee to be compensated. 
3 
The Appellant has not only failed to establish any 
excusable neglect, but has failed to set forth any meritorious 
defense as well. He has clearly not shown any abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. All of the trial court's findings 
were supported by the facts and the law. This court should find 
that no abuse of discretion occurred, and that the Denial of the 
Motion to Set Aside the Summary Judgment should be upheld. 
The Appellant also questions the circuit court's 
jurisdiction over the original claim once the counterclaim was 
filed. 
The primary claim in this action falls within the 
circuit court's jurisdiction, less than $20,000. The motion for 
summary judgment on the primary claim was not filed until after 
the counterclaim was dismissed. The Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-108 provides that claims under $20,000 
filed with the district court will be transferred to the circuit 
court. Even if the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the 
counterclaim, which we deny (see Point II, below), the motion for 
summary judgment on the primary claim was not filed until the 
counterclaim was dismissed. If the circuit court had sent the 
matter to district court the primary claim would have most likely 
been sent back to circuit court after the counterclaim had been 
adjudicated. Therefore any error made by the circuit court as to 
the primary claim is harmless. 
4 
II. 
THE CIRCUIT COURT'S JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM 
SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE. 
The Appellant's sole argument for setting aside the 
judgment on the counterclaim is that the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction over the matter. There are two general types of 
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic-
tion. In this case, the trial court had both. 
Personal Jurisdiction. The trial court had personal 
jurisdiction over the Appellant. He was a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. The lease was entered into within Salt 
Lake County. Also, Appellant submitted himself to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court by filing his Answer and 
Counterclaim without objection to the court's personal 
jurisdiction over him. It is hornbook law that a person may 
subject himself to the jurisdiction of a court by failing to 
object to the court's jurisdiction and taking advantage of the 
court by seeking relief by the court. Because the Appellant 
sought a judgment, the court had personal jurisdiction over him. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. The trial court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims for money and 
judgments for property. There is no question that the trial 
court had jurisdiction over such actions. Appellant's complaint 
is really not that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, but that the trial court did not have authority to 
grant relief over and above $20,000.00 of Appellant's counter-
claim. 
5 
If a court of lesser jurisdiction has advantages to a 
plaintiff, that plaintiff should have a right to waive recovery 
of amounts over the jurisdictional limit of the court and submit 
herself to the jurisdiction of the court for the amount recover-
able in that court. An obvious example is a person who has a 
claim for recovery which exceeds the maximum jurisdiction of the 
small claims court. The party knows that relief may be limited 
to a certain dollar amount, however, because of the advantages of 
small claims court, e.g. lower costs, no attorneys, etc., the 
party may wish to waive any claim to amounts of money over the 
small claims court jurisdiction and proceed in small claims 
court. Considering costs and attorneys fees in higher courts, a 
party may even be able to net more money by doing so. Waiving 
part of a claim by submitting to a court's jurisdiction does not 
deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction up to the 
maximum amount of its jurisdiction. 
Many people in many cases may claim flamboyant amounts. 
But, if a matter is submitted to that court, knowing the extent 
of the court's ability to grant a judgment, the court does have 
subject matter jurisdiction over that type of a case to the 
extent of its jurisdiction. 
In the present case, the Appellant asked for money 
judgment for damages to personal property. See Verified 
Complaint. The trial court has jurisdiction over such cases. 
The trial court is limited in the dollar recovery it can grant, 
but that does not mean that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. 
6 
If the Appellant determined to submit the matter to the trial 
court to the extent that the trial court could grant relief, then 
he has waived any claim to amounts over and above the amounts 
which the court may award, but the matter does not concern 
jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee seeks affirmance of the lower court's decision 
denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside both judgments. 
DATED THIS fa day of May, 1995. 
DAVID L. CHURCH 
Attorney for Appellee 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
U.C.A. S 78-2a-3(2)(d) 9 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 10 
Rule 4-108/ The Code of Judicial Administration 11 
8 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
9 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination amy matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
RULE 60, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
10 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
RULE 4-108, THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
11 
Rule 4-108. Transfer of civil cases from district court to 
circuit court. 
Intent: 
To establish a policy governing the transfer of civil cases filed in the district 
court to the circuit court, where the case lies within the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of both courts, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3-4. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district and circuit courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Except for the types of cases specified in paragraph (2), all civil cases 
filed in district courts, where the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive 
of court costsy may be transferred to the circuit court. 
(2) The following types of cases shall not be subject to transfer to circuit 
court: 
(A) Actions to determine the title to real property, but not actions to 
foreclose mechanics liens. 
(B) Actions of divorce, child custody and paternity. 
(C) Actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
(D) Actions to review the decision of any state administrative agency, 
board, council, commission or hearing officer. 
(E) Actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs. 
(F) All other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
(3) The presiding judge shall issue an order for the transfer of a case pursu-
ant to this rule. 
(4) A copy of the transfer order shall be sent by the clerk of the district 
court to the presiding judge of the circuit court where the case is being trans-
ferred and to each party to the action or the party's attorney of record. 
(Amended effective May 15, 1994.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- after "presiding judge" in Subdivision (3), and 
ment substituted "$20,000- for "$10,000** in made stylistic changes. 
Subdivision (1), deleted "or the assigned judge" 
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